BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
2408:8459:1090::/44
Announced exactly
- 2408:8459:1090::/44AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1090::
- Registry
- APNIC · China · May 31, 2012
- Delegated block
- 2408:8400:: – 2408:87ff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Covering routes
- 2408:8459::/32AS17816China Unicom IP network China169 Guangdong provinceRPKI Valid2408:8459::
More-specific routes
- 2408:8459:1090::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1090::
- 2408:8459:1091::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1091::
- 2408:8459:1092::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1092::
- 2408:8459:1093::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1093::
- 2408:8459:1094::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1094::
- 2408:8459:1095::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1095::
- 2408:8459:1096::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1096::
- 2408:8459:1097::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1097::
- 2408:8459:1098::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1098::
- 2408:8459:1099::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:1099::
- 2408:8459:109a::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:109a::
- 2408:8459:109b::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:109b::
- 2408:8459:109c::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:109c::
- 2408:8459:109d::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:109d::
- 2408:8459:109e::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:109e::
- 2408:8459:109f::/48AS17622China Unicom Guangzhou networkRPKI Valid2408:8459:109f::
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 90.190.0.0/15 (Telia Eesti, AS3249). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.