BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
2a03:d000:2000::/36
Announced exactly
- 2a03:d000:2000::/36AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2000::
- Registry
- RIPE NCC · Russia · Dec 7, 2010
- Delegated block
- 2a03:d000:: – 2a03:d007:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 2a03:d000:21e1::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:21e1::
- 2a03:d000:22c1::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:22c1::
- 2a03:d000:22e1::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:22e1::
- 2a03:d000:2341::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2341::
- 2a03:d000:2461::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2461::
- 2a03:d000:24a1::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:24a1::
- 2a03:d000:26a1::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:26a1::
- 2a03:d000:2761::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2761::
- 2a03:d000:2781::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2781::
- 2a03:d000:27c3::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:27c3::
- 2a03:d000:2821::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2821::
- 2a03:d000:2921::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2921::
- 2a03:d000:2980::/43AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2980::
- 2a03:d000:2981::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2981::
- 2a03:d000:29a1::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:29a1::
- 2a03:d000:2c02::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2c02::
- 2a03:d000:2d00::/48AS31133PJSC MegaFonRPKI Valid2a03:d000:2d00::
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 90.190.0.0/15 (Telia Eesti, AS3249). This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.